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Introduction
Bentham’s penal theory has yet to be fully examined. 1 Indeed, conventional
commentary has tended to focus on the architectural device of the panopticon
penitentiary rather than on any detailed assessment of the principles of punishment on
which the prison was based.2 Some critics have gone so far as to draw Bentham’s
general penal principles from the regime proposed for the panopticon.3 In the process
such commentators have tended to ignore Bentham’s own penal ideas in favour of one
of his penal devices; and, whilst his devices are of value, none of them ought to be
allowed to overshadow the ideas on which they were founded.4 The net result of the
controversy surrounding the panopticon prison is that ideas of surveillance, control
and regimentation, are now immediately, and often erroneously, brought to mind with
1 Most discussions rely upon the general surveys of E. Halévy, La formation du radicalisme
philosophique, 3 vols., Paris, 1901-4, hereafter references are to the translation by M. Morris, The
Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, London, 1928; rept. 1972; and L. Radzinowicz, A History of
English Criminal Law, 4 vols., London, 1948-86, hereafter references are to vol. i. Recently, more
detailed work has been done by H.L.A. Hart, ‘Bentham and Beccaria’, Essays on Bentham: Studies in
Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford, 1982; and F. Rosen, ‘New Introduction’, in An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford, 1996 (The Collected Works of
Jeremy Bentham, henceforth IPML (CW), pp. xxxi-lxxviii. On Bentham and the death penalty see H.A.
Bedau, ‘Bentham’s Utilitarian Critique of the Death Penalty’, The Journal of Criminal Law, lxxiv.
(1985), pp. 1033-65; and J.E. Crimmins, ‘Strictures on Paley’s Net: Capital Punishment and the Power
to Pardon’, Bentham Newsletter, xi. (1987), pp. 23-34.
2 Since the publication of Michel Foucault’s Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, Paris, 1975,
trans. Alan Sheridan, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, London, 1977, Bentham’s
panopticon has frequently been taken as evidence of a more coercive and regimented society. See also
M. Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850, New
York, 1978, pp. 77-8. For a criticism of Foucault’s position see J. Semple, ‘Foucault and Bentham: A
Defence of Panopticism’, Utilitas, iv. (1992), pp. 105-20.
3 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish; G. Himmelfarb, ‘The Haunted House of Jeremy Bentham’,
Victorian Minds, London, 1968; C.F. Bahmueller, The National Charity Company: Jeremy Bentham’s
Silent Revolution, California, 1981; and D.J. Manning, The Mind of Jeremy Bentham, London, 1968.
Such commentaries appear to exaggerate the relevance of the idea of the panopticon institution to give
weight, it seems, to their own schemes. Professor Roy Porter has convincingly shown how disciplinary
institutions were not, in the eighteenth century, used by the British state for the purposes suggested by
Foucault, i.e. as a means of regimentation and incarceration. See R. Porter, Mind Forg’d Manacles: A
History of Madness in England from the Restoration to the Regency, London, 1987, pp. 141 and 168.
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the mention of Bentham and punishment.5 It is important to stress, therefore, that
before embarking upon any consideration of Bentham’s penal theory, it is necessary
first to dissociate the pervasive and pejorative ideas surrounding the panopticon
prison from the underlying penal theory upon which the scheme for imprisonment
was based. Surveillance, control, and regimentation are not the inevitable products of
Bentham’s thinking on punishment, and the panopticon project, which emphasised
such concepts so implacably, must be seen simply as one amongst many suggested
forms of complex punishment.6
It can be argued that Bentham’s penal writings provide a substantial,
comprehensive and sophisticated justification for the infliction of legal punishment. In
this regard they form a central part of the construct described by Gerald Postema as,
‘a jurisprudential debate of historic dimensions and fundamental philosophical
significance’. 7 Individual human motivation is given prominence throughout the
process of re-affirming the value of legal systems as a means of ensuring fair
treatment and security for the entire citizen body. In displaying the complexities and
subtleties required in the recognition of individual circumstances and sensibilities,
Bentham emphasised the primary role of legislation as a defender of the security and
welfare of the individual. The premise from which Bentham started was that no two
people are the same, no two crimes are the same, and it is the duty of the law to
accommodate such variables before inflicting pain, in the name of the state, for the
protection of itself and other citizen members of that state. As Sir Leon Radzinowicz
put it,
4 For two notable exceptions which do take account of Bentham’s penal thinking see J. Semple,
Bentham’s Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary, Oxford, 1993 and S. McConville, A History
of English Prison Administration, London, 1981.
5 As Garland has shown, this is predominantly due to the influence of Foucault, ‘whose... inflated
rhetoric takes over and describes modern society as “the disciplinary society” - a “society of
surveillance” in which we are all subjected to “infinite examination” in the “panoptic machine”‘. D.
Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory, Oxford, 1990, p. 146. Garland
confronts the greatest excesses of Foucault in ‘Beyond the Power Perspective: A Critique of Foucault
on Punishment’, ibid., ch. 7.
6 Indeed, Garland stresses that the penal theory contained within Bentham’s IPML (CW) is a vision of
an ideal system of punishment, and is not, as Foucault imagines it to be, an actual description of
eighteenth century punishment. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, p. 163. Even a brief
examination of Bentham’s penal writings indicates how other forms of punishment, apart from
imprisonment, could satisfy the demands of his theory.
7 G.J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, Oxford, 1986, p. vii. A penal code was
envisaged as one of the four main codes making up Bentham’s Pannomion, the complete code of laws.
See Constitutional Code, i. eds. F. Rosen and J.H. Burns (Oxford, 1983), (CW), p. xi.
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thus the subjective approach to criminal acts led Bentham to an equally
subjective approach to punishment. He urged the adoption of a principle
which in modern French criminal science has been called le principe de
l’individualisation de la peine.8
This essay aims to introduce the key elements both of the historical context from
within which such a penal theory was developed and of the theory itself, along with
some mention also of the forms of punishment recommended. First, however, a few
points ought to be made concerning the texts where Bentham’s penal theory is to be
found.
1. Bentham’s Punishment Writings
Bentham’s ideas on punishment are contained first, within his own published works,9
second, in a large body of extant manuscripts, and third, they are summarised in
various versions produced by later editors. Reliance should be placed first and
foremost upon work seen through the press by Bentham himself, though this is closely
followed by manuscript material, which can provide hitherto unknown insights into
Bentham’s developed thinking on the subject. As far as the ‘theory of punishment’ is
concerned by far the most important of the printed works is An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation and substantial and profitable use can, indeed
should, be made of this well-known work if his theory is to be properly understood.
All of the key elements discussed below can be found examined in this work.10
Despite the value of IPML, however, many valuable insights into the
development of Bentham’s theory have come directly from an exploration of his
manuscripts and there is undoubtedly much more work to be done in the archive.
Many hundreds of pages of text exist covering every aspect of penal theory from
8 Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, 376. Radzinowicz shows how this principle, established in R.
Saleilles’s book L’individualisation de la peine, Paris, 1898, had been discussed earlier in Austria by
W.E. Wahlberg in the essay Das Princip der Individualisierung in der Strafrechtspflege, Vienna, 1869,
rendered in English as ‘The Necessity of Individualising’. See Radzinowicz., English Criminal Law, p.
14n.
9 Apart from IPML two further works, published by Bentham himself, are particularly useful: A View of
the Hard-Labour Bill, London, 1778, and Jer. Bentham to his fellow citizens of France on death
punishment, London, 1831. Both are reproduced in, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring, 11
vols. (Edinburgh, 1843); see iv. pp. 6-35 and i. pp. 525-32 respectively. Hereafter, ‘Bowring’.
10 IPML was largely complete by 1780, incorporating his penal theory developed during 1776-8, but
not published until 1789, when it appears to have attracted little attention. On its poor reception see An
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 5 (2002)
4
initial principles to two attempts at the drafting of complete penal codes. 11 The
difficulties presented by the manuscripts are numerous. They are in a jumbled and
confused state; there is much re-working of similar themes and topics; sometimes
texts have been so heavily amended that neither the original nor the revised meanings
are clear. Add to this the standard problem of uncertain dating for early Bentham
manuscripts, and deteriorating script for later manuscripts, and the problems faced in
the reconstruction of Bentham’s intended penal thought are great. Nevertheless, the
existence of manuscript material allows progress to be made in the recovery of
Bentham’s ideas, and despite the complexity and apparent confusion of the material it
is certainly possible to claim that a coherent picture of Bentham’s fundamental
concerns and specific proposals in relation to punishment does emerge.
Once Bentham’s discussion of punishment has been examined in IPML it is
considerably safer to approach the published works compiled by his editors. In
relation to punishment these include two works edited by Étienne Dumont, 12 a
recension by Richard Smith;13 and a production by John Bowring entitled, ‘Principles
of Penal Law’. 14 These edited texts are frequently thought to offer the most
convenient access to Bentham’s discussions of punishment. They must, however, be
treated with great care, mainly because it is difficult to identify exactly how far
Bentham’s text has been emended. The foundation for the vast majority of this
editorial work is volume one of Dumont’s Théorie des peines et des récompenses, and
there are problems with Dumont’s text. For not only did Dumont publish selectively
from Bentham’s manuscripts, but those manuscripts titled ‘Theory of Punishment’
were originally written in English. Thus, this key work, clearly containing an
important treatment of Bentham’s penal theory, was selectively translated and
published in French in 1811, then retranslated back into English some nineteen years
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (CW), ed. J.H. Burns (London, 1970) p. xli,
note 3.
11 Over 1500 folios are catalogued as containing material on penal theory. Several thousand more are
related to his Penal Codes. See A. Taylor Milne, The Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham
in the Library of University College, London, London, 1962. Bentham had great plans for his
‘Punishments’, hoping they would successively be published in England, translated into French, and
perhaps even used in Poland. See Correspondence (CW), ii. (1752-80), ed. T.L.S. Sprigge, London,
1968, letter 198, to his brother Samuel (19 January 1777), p. 11.
12 É. Dumont, ed., Traités de législation civile et pénale, ed. É. Dumont, 3 vols., Paris, 1802, and
Théorie des peines et des récompenses, 2 vols., London, 1811.
13 R. Smith, ed., The Rationale of Punishment, London, 1830.
14 Bowring, i. pp. 336-580.
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later in 1830, again with further changes being made; and finally, the work was
incorporated into Bowring’s edition in 1838.15
Whilst the value of Dumont as an editor can be appreciated, so too must be his
limitations.16 There can be little doubt that much important material has been omitted
from Théorie des peines et récompenses, and even with recourse to the manuscripts it
seems unlikely that some of the gaps left by Dumont will ever be effectively filled.17
Not only has much been omitted, however, but text has also been added, and again the
source of many additions is likely to remain uncertain. Most additions probably came
from the hand of Dumont, since, by his own admission, he treated the manuscripts
very freely, 18 yet, as was the rule for many editorial endeavours in the early
nineteenth-century, such additions are rarely identified. Many previous commentators
have carefully considered the problems presented by Dumont’s renditions of
Bentham’s work and, despite the difficulties, most have concluded that his texts ought
to be accepted as representative of Bentham’s thought, even though they should be
avoided wherever Bentham’s own texts treat of the same material.19 It must therefore
be stressed that the starting point for any study of Bentham’s theory of punishment
remains An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
2. Historical Context
By returning to the intellectual environment within which Bentham’s penal theory
was developed it can be seen that, whilst initially drawing from contemporary penal
debate, his own analysis struck out in a radical new direction. From the starting point
of Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments20, Bentham pursued an explanation for
15 See J.H. Burns’s discussion on the dating of Bentham’s ‘Punishment’ manuscripts on which Dumont
based his edition, IPML (CW), pp. xxxviii-xli.
16 For a discussion of this see Lieberman, Province of Legislation, 288-90; R. Harrison, Bentham,
London, 1983, pp. ix-xiv, 138-40; and, C. Blamires, ‘Étienne Dumont: Genevan Apostle of Utility’,
Utilitas, ii. (1990), pp. 55-70.
17 Many omissions were no doubt necessary since Dumont was seeking to produce a volume that would
be readily understood. A further question concerns whether manuscripts can actually be found to
compare Dumont’s work with. See ibid.
18 ‘These manuscripts, though much more voluminous than the work I have presented to the public, are
very incomplete [...] I have freely used the rights of an Editor - according to the nature of the text and
the occasion, I have translated, commented, abridged, or supplied, but [...] this co-operation on my part
has had reference to the details only, [...] it is not my work [...] it is, as faithfully as the nature of things
will permit, the work of Mr. Bentham’. See É. Dumont’s ‘Advertisement’, translated in Smith’s,
Rationale of Punishment, pp. 4-5.
19 R. Harrison, Bentham, p. xii.
20 Cesare Beccaria Bonesara, Dei delitti e delle pene, Leghorn, false imprint Haarlem, 1764,. First
English edition: An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, translated from the Italian; with a commentary,
attributed to Mons. de Voltaire, translated from the French, London, 1767.
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punishment which contrasted sharply with the notion of the ‘vengeance of the state’
on which many governments in Europe relied.21 In dramatically redirecting the search
for a clarified justification of legal punishment, Beccaria’s appealing mixture of
Helvétian proto-utilitarian thought and Rousseauean contractarianism inceptively
stated the need for penal theory to pursue more directly the welfare of all those in
society.22
To these ends Beccaria advocated the protection of the liberties of those who
adhered to the law; he emphasised the need to establish certainty and celerity of
punishment for those who transgressed the law; and he sought to revive respect for the
law by advocating a new mildness in the apportioning of punishment for those who
broke the law.23 These humane and liberal principles were rapidly adopted by reform-
minded men and women across Europe;24 and in England also, they were received
with enthusiasm and admiration, although it has been argued that many men of status
and wealth regarded Beccaria’s criticisms as more appropriate to continental penal
systems than to Britain’s. 25 For Bentham, Beccaria’s work was exceptionally
influential, and he used the penal principles reflected in On Crimes and Punishment to
connect his own justifications for legal punishment firmly to a utilitarian base. And,
although influenced by the powerful, ever-present influence of Montesquieu,
Bentham’s use of the catalytic thinking of Beccaria, combined with his own rejection
of the traditional concepts of common law and social contract,26 produced a profound
break with the prevalent English understanding of law and punishment with which he
was surrounded.
21 Foucault is clearly correct in saying that change occurred, though he overemphasises the role of new
institutions by regarding them as ‘the most visible aspect of various, more profound processes’. See
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 210.
22 Claude Adrien Helvétius, De l’esprit, Paris, 1758. Jean-Jacque Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et
les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les homes, Amsterdam, 1755, and Du Contrat Social, Amsterdam,
1762.
23 See ‘Introduction’, in C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments: Translated from the Italian in the
Author’s Original Order, trans. D. Young, Indianapolis, 1986.
24 On the positive reception given to Beccaria see ‘Cesare Beccaria: The Influence of Dei Delitti e delle
Pene’, Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, p. 277-80.
25 Douglas Hay suggests that ‘the rhetoric of Whiggism denied that arbitrary measures existed and
claimed that the criminal law was already fixed and determinate’. See ‘Property, Authority and the
Criminal Law’, Albion’s Fatal Tree, Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England , ed. D. Hay, P.
Linebaugh, C. Winslow, J. Rule, E.P. Thompson, London, 1975, p. 58.
26 On Bentham’s critique of the common law (or, more specifically, judge-made law) see Postema,
Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, D. Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined,
Cambridge, 1989, and P. Schofield, ‘Professing Liberal Opinions: The Common Law, Adjudication
and Security in Recent Bentham Scholarship’, Legal History, xvi. (1995), pp. 350-367.
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Yet, despite the direction taken by Bentham he also continued to hold much in
common with his English contemporaries. During the later 1770s and 1780s
Bentham’s ideas were in accord with the general consensus in England regarding the
purpose and forms of punishment as identified in the works of men such as William
Blackstone and William Eden.27 The immediate end of punishment was, they all
agreed, to deter future crime; and, on a wider scale, they concurred that punishment
ought prominently to protect the liberties of law-abiding citizens.28 In practical terms
this agreement amongst many writers of the early to mid-1770s displayed itself in
their showing a collective distaste for imprisonment as a punishment. This distaste
was shared by Bentham. By 1778, however, Bentham, along with others such as Eden
for example, had come to place great value on the possibilities offered by
imprisonment as a means of achieving their theoretical ends of reformation,
disablement and example.29 Clearly great changes were underway at this period, and
Bentham was very much at the forefront of them. It has been well established that the
penitentiary idea of imprisonment had its roots both in the utilitarian thought
exemplified by Bentham, and in the concepts of natural justice and natural religion
permeating the thought of less radically minded men such as Eden. 30 Bentham’s
interest in imprisonment was undoubtedly stimulated by contemporary debate and
government policy
Section 3: The Main Components of Bentham’s Theory of Punishment
Bentham’s utilitarian perspective on punishment, so greatly influenced by Beccaria,
identified the sources of motivation as the key to understanding what was involved in
the encouragement of law-abiding behaviour. 31 Consequently, his discussion of
motivation provides the obvious starting point for any analysis of his discussion of
punishment.
27 See William Blackstone, judge and first Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford, Commentaries on the
Laws of England, 4 vols., Oxford, 1765-9; and William Eden, first Baron Auckland, statesman and
diplomatist, Principles of Penal Law, London, 1771.
28 This is not to deny, however, that they profoundly disagreed about the meaning of the word ‘liberty’.
29 On these ends in Bentham see IPML, p. 158, note a.
30 See Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain, ch. 3; and Semple, Bentham’s Prison, ch. 2.
31 On the sanctions as forms of social motivation see D. Baumgardt, Bentham and the Ethics of Today,
Princeton, 1952, pp. 218-21.
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3.1 The Sources of Motivation Equated to the Sources of Punishment
In Chapter 3 of IPML Bentham introduced a specific and fundamental division of the
sources from which pain described as ‘punishment’ could be said to originate.
Drawing on his wider philosophy, he placed great emphasis on the variety of directing
sanctions, and he carefully detailed the effective restraints on behaviour derived from
the four sources of pain and pleasure. These he termed as the physical, political, moral
and religious sanctions.32 Thus pain, he explained, came from nature as the physicial
sanction, from the operation of a magistrate operating according to a sovereign’s will
as the political or legal sanction, from the spontaneous disapproval of an individual’s
community as the moral sanction, and finally, from the ‘hand of a superior invisible
being’ as the religious sanction.
In his attempt to elicit a more ‘scientific’ approach to the debate on punishment
Bentham differed considerably from his contemporaries, not only with his expression
of legal punishment as the embodiment of an unquestionable evil,33 but also with this
broader use of the term ‘punishment’ itself. Punishment was, for Bentham, a
particular category of pain, produced not just as the result of some individual action,
but of an action that could be labelled an ‘offence’.34 In Bentham’s words, ‘the idea of
punishment presupposes the idea of offence: punishment, as such, not being inflicted
but in consideration of offence’.35
The development of Bentham’s understanding of the motivating sanctions, as
responses to such offending, has been widely documented. From as early as A
Fragment on Government and A Comment on the Commentaries, three sanctions, the
political,36 moral and religious, are discussed. Later, in IPML, a fourth sanction (the
32 IPML, p.35.
33 See the famous quote on punishment as an evil at, IPML (CW), p. 158; for Richard Smith’s version
see, Rationale, p. 1. Bentham followed Hobbes in describing punishment as an evil. See Leviathan, p.
202: ‘A punishment, is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that
which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men
may thereby the better be disposed to obedience’. This view of punishment stood in contrast to the
general view, particularly of practising magistrates, that since punishment satisfied the love of
symmetry and the desire for vengeance it could be regarded as a good: see Halévy, Philosophic
Radicalism, p. 55.
34 The actual pain felt was the same as any other pain: pain was pain for Bentham regardless of its
source. See IPML (CW) p. 36, where he suggested pains ‘differ not [...] in kind’.
35 Ibid., p. 4.
36 The political sanction incorporates the legal sanction; the moral sanction is synonymous with the
popular sanction. See Deontology (CW), ed. A. Goldworth, Oxford, 1983, pp. 151-152 n.
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physical) was identified;37 and finally, in the unfinished Deontology of 1814, the role
of ‘sympathy’ was given a new classification as a fifth independent sanction.38
This aspect of his thought introduced a subtle and sophisticated element to the
debate that proved to be of profound importance for both Bentham and later penal
discussion. In one very practical sense, this variety of motivational factors explains
Bentham’s desire to reduce the involvement of litigants, prosecutors, magistrates and
judges in the maintenance of lawful behaviour, since it would be unreasonable to
expect the range of individual motivation to be satisfactorily influenced solely by
legal means.39 In other words punishment produced more pain for an offender than the
purely legal kind. This held great importance for his basic theory and can perhaps be
best understood by next considering his notion of the distribution of pain resulting
from the imposition of a legal sanction - the ‘artificial’ pain inflicted by a state’s
system of law.40
3.2. The Distribution of Pain
The analysis of the distribution of pain, as presented in IPML, illustrates how pain
from the political, or legal, sanction informs Bentham’s entire penal theory and forms
a central component of his philosophy of punishment. This original appreciation of
the diffusion of the pain of punishment provided further foundations both for
Bentham’s attack on common, or judge-made, law and for his suggestions for reform.
He believed contemporary theories entirely misunderstood the action of pain
produced by legal punishment and concluded that only a utilitarian system of positive
law could respond to the complexities of offending behaviour.
Again, seeking a ‘scientific’ approach to punishment, Bentham went to
considerable lengths to discover the effect of pain as it was inflicted on society, both
37 IPML (CW) p. 34.
38 See Deontology (CW), pp. xxi, 183, 152, 197, and 201-4. Bentham made this further distinction
when he came to regard the social or sympathetic feelings aroused by the consideration of pleasure or
pain experienced, or about to be experienced, by another person as having a fundamentally distinct
origin compared with pleasures and pains of a self-regarding kind. He concluded that the source of
such feelings ought to be classified separately. For a discussion of the concept of sympathy in the
eighteenth century see, F.L. Van Holthoon, ‘Adam Smith and David Hume: with Sympathy’, Utilitas, v.
(1993), pp. 35-48.
39 Whilst Bentham sought a reduction in the influence of judges he ultimately concluded that their
discretionary assessment was an essential requirement for a utilitarian, legal system. See Postema,
Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, p. 349.
40 Pain was ‘artificial’ because it was deliberately and specifically man-made, or ‘annexed by political
authority to an offensive act, in one instance’: see IPML, p. 157. All other pains of punishment were
deemed to be natural.
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by offences and punishments. From the perspective of pain caused by offending, he
suggested a single test sufficient to determine whether an act was ‘wrong’, and
whether it ought consequently to be classified as an ‘offence’ and made preventable
by law. This test sought it identify the experience of pain suffered by some assignable
or unassignable individual or individuals.41 The presentation of, and emphasis on,
criminal behaviour as depending upon harm experienced by an individual and
forming an assault upon the wider community can be found in Beccaria’s Crimes and
Punishments, but Bentham’s use was substantially different from Beccaria’s.
Of crucial importance was Bentham’s insistence that any assessment of the
extent of harm inflicted was dependent upon the motive, circumstances and intention
under the influence of which an act was carried out. Beccaria, on the other hand,
seems to have been daunted by the variety and complexity of circumstances that his
argument suggested might need to be accounted for, and, in an attempt to simplify
such assessment, he rejected the possibility of ever being able to gauge the ‘intention’
of an offender. Bentham clearly believed such an assessment was possible, and
consequently considerations of intention, motive and disposition of an offender
formed a central feature of his own utilitarian assessment of harm done by an offence
and danger threatened by the offender in future.
Bentham believed the mischief of any act could be divided into two parts. The
first he called ‘primary’ mischief, which related to the pain sustained by an assignable
individual or individuals. The second part he labelled ‘secondary’ mischief, for, whilst
clearly originating from the former, this secondary mischief extended throughout the
whole, wider society, affecting innumerable unknown, unassignable, individuals.
Most eighteenth-century discussions of punishment, from Montesquieu to Kant, had
similarly adopted a definition of mischief as a painful or detrimental act against
known persons, but this often formed the end as well as the beginning of the analysis
of the ‘effects’ of an offence.
So with retributive justice, for example, it was possible for retaliation to be
applied on behalf of the victim in proportion to the pain suffered by that specific
person. Pain was not seen to radiate beyond the immediate sufferer from the offence;
or, if it was recognised, it was not taken into account in consideration of the
41 ‘Is an offence committed? it is the tendency which it has to destroy, in such or such persons, some of
these pleasures, or to produce some of these pains, that constitutes the mischief of it, and the ground for
punishing it’: IPML (CW), p. 49.
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seriousness of the offence. With Bentham, however, even with this most easily
identifiable part of the mischief of an offence, he carefully distinguished between two
distinct branches: the ‘original’ - being the immediate suffering of a person on their
own account; and the ‘derivative’ - being the share of suffering which might fall on
some other assignable person or persons. Bentham was clearly including suffering
conventionally excluded from assessments of punishment since he incorporated
within this category those individuals who suffered by way of direct connection with
the victim, or simply from a sympathetic feeling towards the victim.42
This broad understanding of ‘pain’ as a varied product of offences enabled
Bentham to draw distinctions regarding the manner in which offences affected the
society in which they were perpetrated. The benefit of approaching the question from
such an angle was to open up numerous categories of pain-producing mischiefs, and
therefore to better focus and effect to any corrective application of penal suffering.
In this sense an understanding that an offence was operating in a certain manner
on those witnessing, or learning of such an offence, might perhaps have been more
important than the question of precisely quantifying how much mischief was being
produced. It could be said, therefore, that Bentham’s analysis was more concerned
with recognising the action of pain, unhappiness, or fear, and defining their operation
in specific directions, than it was in calculating the precise quantities of pain being
created. 43 With Bentham’s concern for the condition of unknown, ‘unassignable’
individuals, who were affected at a second, third or even greater remove from the
instigating mischief, there remained, it seems, little possibility of precise calculation.44
Thus, and perhaps paradoxically, we are presented with a theory which seeks to
‘calculate’ likely consequences in detail yet without insisting on the assigning of
precise quantities in order to be effective. The question must then be, did Bentham
sacrifice precise quantification for a better appreciation of pain’s complex distribution?
With many references to quantification this seems improbable, yet Bentham’s theory
42 Ibid., p. 144.
43 Although Bentham appreciated the difficulty in calculating the ‘sums’ of pain at work, the numerous
directions in which he was able to define mischief as capable of working does seem to go some way
towards what Beccaria called a ‘mathematically rigorous investigation’. See Beccaria, Crimes and
Punishments, p. 17. Bentham’s interest in the variety of directions in which pain can operate appears to
relate to the notion of ‘multi-dimensional utility’ as discussed in T. Warke, ‘Multi-Dimensional Utility
and the Index Number Problem: Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Qualitative Hedonism’, Utilitas, xii.
(2000), pp. 176-203.
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is certainly at its most sophisticated and demanding as it attempts to account for the
intricate and widespread nature of the distribution of pain originating from apparently
‘simple’ offensive actions, aware, as it is, that all can never be known for sure.
3.3. Proportionality in Punishment
Closely related to Bentham’s notion of the distribution of pain of punishment are his
thirteen rules of proportion. The development of specific rules for the purpose of
better proportioning punishments to offences was clearly an obvious contribution to
the Enlightenment project of rational explanation, and better regulation, of existing
practice. These rules embodied a method of proportioning formed from an
overwhelmingly utilitarian perspective.45 With nine of his rules he established the
foundations for increases in amounts of pain provided as punishment.46 Three others
protected against excesses: rules five and six limited increases in pain, whilst rule
twelve provided for a positive diminution. Finally, a thirteenth rule stressed the point
that precise calculation was not required and small disproportions might be ignored.
With this plan Bentham sought a mechanism for both an accurate assessment of
offending and the controlled imposition of punishment.
The crux of the theory was an overwhelming emphasis placed on quantities of
pain and in this respect the first five rules were of most importance:
the four first [rules], we may perceive, serve to mark out the limits on
the side of diminution: the limits below which a punishment ought not to
be diminished: the fifth, the limits on the side of increase: the limits
above which it ought not to be increased.47
Not only was this fifth rule of proportion, which limited the increase, central to
Bentham’s scheme for the reduction of punishments as observed in contemporary
legal practice, but each of the first four rules added quantities of pain in such a way as
to constantly make any increase proportional to the perceived increase in the severity
44 Baumgardt has stressed, following Dumont, that whilst an ‘arithmetic’ approach is frequently called
upon, its precision is problematic, and no less so for his theory of punishment than for his moral
calculus in general. See Ethics of Today, pp. 361, and 459.
45 Some small allowance was made for non-utilitarian considerations, such as satisfaction provided for
victims of offences, but this was completely subordinated to Bentham’s utilitarian consequentialism.
46 See IPML (CW), Ch. 14, rules 1-4 and rules 7-11, pp. 166-171.
47 Ibid., p. 169.
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of the offence. Seeking such control in the infliction of pain reveals Bentham to be on
common ground with a prominent strain of contemporary English reform.48 Yet, more
lenient punishment could only ever be expressed by Bentham as a reduction in the
quantity of pain linked proportionately to a new, lower assessment of the pain spread
by the offence. In other words, less pain of punishment could only be justified once
his theory of the distribution of pains had discovered the degree of mischief to be, in
fact, lower than that conventionally assumed. In these terms it can be seen that
Bentham’s abovementioned theory of the distribution of pains was as important to his
demand for a reduction in levels of severity as was his novel theory of proportion.
3.4. Calculation and the Surfeit of Pleasure over Pain
A further complication was introduced with Bentham’s suggestion that to be
appropriate the evil of punishment ought ultimately to produce a surfeit of pleasure
over pain.49 Such a requirement carried with it the implication that each and every
legal punishment, regardless of the category to which it might belong, had the
potential of becoming, on each new occasion it was used, morally unacceptable.50
That is to say, in Bentham’s terms, any offence might be found ‘unmeet for
punishment’.51 One result of an emphasis on future benefit could be to encourage the
judge, at the point of sentencing, to take the broadest view of the future consequences
of both offence and recommended punishment. The focus of any ‘calculation’ was
again identified in extremely general terms. This would, as with his theory of
distribution, seem to shift Bentham’s position even further away from the advocation
of the need, or possibility, of precise calculation, since, with a more general approach,
unassignable pains were once again included in the assessment and precise effects of
offending actions could never be known for sure.
The consequences of such general, consequentialist thinking offered a
significant threat to conventional, eighteenth-century theories, both of retribution and
48 Found represented in both Blackstone’s and Eden’s use of Beccaria’s work.. For a more detailed
discussion see A.J. Draper, ‘Cesare Beccaria’s Influence on English Discussions of Punishment’,
History of European Ideas, xxvi. (2000), pp. 177-99.
49 The idea of a future surfeit of pleasure is derived from notions of punishment needing to be
‘profitable’ given at IPML, p. 163.
50 This appears to be consonant with the ‘classic liberal doctrine that non-restriction of liberty needs no
defence but intrusion on it always requires justification’. See Introduction to ‘Jeremy Bentham and J.S.
Mill’, Modern Political Theory from Hobbes to Marx, ed. J. Lively and A. Reeve, London, 1989, p.
191.
51 IPML, chapter 13.
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deterrence. Notions of retributive threats were almost wholly removed from
Bentham’s theory of punishment, but so too was any justification of a
disproportionate deterrent threat.52 In fact, if it could be known for sure that a similar
offence would never again be committed, then, from his utilitarian standpoint, he
would find no justification for the infliction of any punishment. For Bentham pain,
and thus punishment, was always a social negative, unless it promised greater
pleasure in future.
Section 3.5: Bentham’s Favoured Forms of Punishment
Bentham’s preferred forms of punishment certainly changed over the course of his life.
In his earlier writings a variety of corporal punishments were recommended;53 in his
middle years the panopticon penitentiary was his prime interest; and finally, in the
1820s, evidence is available to suggest he felt an increasing attachment to non-
afflictive, though still complex, punishments, especially those of banishment and
fining.54
For Bentham a satisfactory mode of punishment had to satisfy some55 of his
eleven defined ‘properties’ of punishment.56 Most importantly, punishment had to
provide a variable quantity of pain in response to the varying quantities of mischief
caused by offences.57 This continuing stress on quantification always remained a
constant rule governing Bentham’s assessment of an appropriate type of punishment.
52 A retributive threat is one which threatens the infliction of ‘good’ punishment, as a desert, for a past
offence. Retributive punishment also includes the modern, derived concept of ‘weak retributivism [...]
which regards desert of unpleasant treatment as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
punishment’. See N. Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values, London,
1988, p. 53.
53 Some were conventional, others were not: see Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, pp. 384 n, and
388 n. Bentham’s ideas for devices and contrivances included elaborate torments such as the thin-
backed, iron-horse for the punishment of highwaymen, and the iron frame for the half-roasting of those
guilty of fire-raising. And various suggestions for elaborate displays, supposed to ridicule offenders,
succeed only in descending into black comedy. For example, he suggests piercing the hand of forgers
with a pin - but arranged in imitation of a pen; and of setting the deserter of children on a pedestal,
garlanded with life-size figures of his offspring, and with an inscription comparing him to an ostrich
which ‘droppeth her egg in the sand and careth not what becometh of her young’. UC cxliii. 28. All of
these outlandish suggestions come from his earliest manuscripts. For a lively discussion see Semple,
Bentham’s Prison, pp. 36-8.
54 Complex punishments are those which attempt to achieve several ends by several means. For
Bentham’s catalogue and discussion of such punishments see Bowring, i. 490-516.
55 An effective form of punishment had to embody as many properties of punishment as were required
to satisfy Bentham’s rules of proportion.
56 See IPML, ch. 15.
57 IPML (CW), p. 175.
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Closely related to this key element of variability were the second and third
properties of equability and commensurability.58 The former identified an equalisation
of pain necessary when the same punishment was applied to different individuals, so
ensuring that offenders received the same pain if they committed the same offence.
But it was the latter property of commensurability on which great importance was
placed, for this allowed punishments to be proportioned to other punishments.
These elements combined to encourage Bentham to abandon in the late 1770s
his support for simply corporal inflictions of pain, and to join the enthusiastic
contemporary pursuit of an increased use of penal incarceration. In terms of theory,
the obvious advantage that imprisonment, and particularly panopticon imprisonment,
offered was the greatly improved provision for the property of ‘exemplarity’. 59
Deterrence was a primary aim, and if prisoners could be seen to be suffering, then the
purpose of the punishment could be better fulfilled:
Example, or the preventing others by the terror of the example from the
commission of similar offences. This is the main end of all punishment,
and consequently of the particular mode [panopticon] here in question.60
By the early-1790s, therefore, panopticon imprisonment had become without question
the dominant mode of punishment promoted by Bentham. It offered adequate
punishment for most, if not all, serious offences, for it could inflict both simple and
complex punishment as occasion demanded. Additionally, it used the means of
reward to increase its properties of reformation. Obviously Bentham envisaged the
panopticon as an institution operating primarily on the psychological motivations of
those incarcerated, though it should be noted that ‘corporal’ pain still formed an
intrinsic part of the punishment. This was not, therefore, simply punishment of ‘the
mind’ as it has sometimes been portrayed, 61 but equally it was an effective
punishment of the body, and it could be so in a variety of ways.
Throughout the period of Bentham’s intense focus on penitentiary imprisonment
the main legal punishment for serious offences continued to be capital punishment.
58 Ibid., pp.175-6.
59 Ibid., p. 178.
60 ‘Panopticon; Postscript - Part II. Principles and Plan of Management’, Bowring, iv. p. 122 (originally
published in 1791).
61 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, passim.
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The death penalty was universally attacked by penal reformers in the late eighteenth
century, though it was not until 1830 that Bentham published the reasons for his own
opposition to capital punishment. He drew up a pamphlet on the death penalty,
specifically for the people of France,62 and throughout this text he displays all the
fundamental penal principles he had first established in 1776-8. In concise terms,
Bentham denounced capital punishment for possessing the detrimental qualities of
inefficiency, irremissibility, positive maleficence (i.e. tending to produce crimes), and
for the enhancement of evils produced by ill-applied pardons.63 These were described
as features of inaptitude, by which the punishment undermined the purpose for which
it was intended, this being ultimately to produce future pleasure by inflicting legal
pain. In Bentham’s view the pains resulting from capital punishment, and more
particularly from the widespread threat of capital punishment, were judged to be
considerable and excessive.
Conclusion
Several points can be made, therefore, when examining the development of
Bentham’s theory of punishment and considering his preferences for forms or modes
of punishment. Once the construction of his penal theory is seen to be independent of
any particular mode of punishment, and especially once it is disconnected from the
constant association with panopticon imprisonment, his theoretical analysis displays
considerable consistency. The ends of punishment always remain the same:
reformation, disablement and example, 64 and constant, overwhelming emphasis is
placed on the assessment of quantities of pain inflicted in pursuit of these ends.
At the root of all his practical suggestions for punishment lies his treatment of
an individual’s motivation to act. Understanding what motivates the individual to
offend is presented as the key to understanding how to prevent such offending. And
general prevention, for Bentham, depends predominantly on some form of deterrent
example. Those who offended seriously against society ought to be punished, first for
the benefit of the society against which they have shown a disposition to offend, and
second, for their own benefit, which is said to come from the opportunity for reform.
62 Published as Jer. Bentham to his fellow citizens of France on death punishment, London, 1831. The
same text was included in Bowring as an Appendix, ‘On Death Punishment’. See Bowring, i. pp. 525-
32. It has been suggested that the pamphlet was published because of the general interest in capital
punishment following the events in Paris of 1830: see Crimmins, ‘Strictures on Paley’s Net’, p. 33.
63 See ‘On Death Punishment’, Bowring, i. p. 526-31.
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This ‘reform’ can be achieved both by punishment and reward. If incarcerated,
for example, individuals will be habituated to new routines and activities designed to
prepare them for ‘survival’ in an industrial environment. They will be rewarded when
their behaviour is deemed non-offensive by the governing authorities. Throughout his
later discussions of imprisonment Bentham offers a means for restraining, perhaps
even changing, the motivational perspectives of offenders, such that their behaviour
may be brought into accord with societal and legal norms. For this he has been
soundly criticised, and clearly many of his practical suggestions are entirely
inappropriate for the contemporary penal environment. His underlying theory,
however, may not be so easily discarded, and much of what he says, especially in
terms of ‘disposition’ and ‘intention’ of offenders, and distribution of pain in society,
deserves further consideration.
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